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Highlights
• This Policy Contribution reviews the major challenges faced by the euro area, and
discusses recent initiatives and the way forward. Some implications are drawn
out for Latvia’s euro accession, which is likely to be beneficial on balance.
• The euro area faces three major challenges: (1) high private and public debt in
some of its parts together with a requirement for competitiveness adjustment that
in some countries has barely started; (2) weak growth outlook; (3) continued
banking-sector fragility that, with sovereign stress, feeds a negative feedback
loop. The euro area has agreed many significant measures to overcome these pro-
blems, including the European Stability Mechanism and the fiscal compact. The
21 February agreement on Greece removes a major source of financial instability
even though it is likely that further debt reductions will be needed. Significant
concerns remain, the most important of which are the slow real economic adjust-
ment and the largely unaddressed banking-sovereign fragility. The fiscal compact
raises the issue of appropriate fiscal stabilisation tools at the euro-area level.
• Countries that will soon join the euro should actively shape the debate about the
further development of the overall set-up. For Latvia, joining the euro makes sense
because Latvia has kept its exchange rate fixed and has undergone internal adjust-
ment. In its euro-area accession negotiations, Latvia should ensure that it does
not participate in any of the currently ongoing financial assistance programmes.
This Policy Contribution reproduces evidence given by Guntram B. Wolff to the Latvian
parliament’s European affairs committee, 22 February 2012. Guntram B. Wolff
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1. John Maynard Keynes
wrote extensively at a dif-
ferent time and in a differ-
ent context about the
problem of external debt
payments, but his lessons
remain valid today.
EUROPEAN LEADERS ASSEMBLED for many sum-
mits during 2011 to decide on the fate of the euro
area. In 2012, we should expect a large number of
further summits. The euro area still faces severe
challenges. The ongoing crisis clearly exposes the
failure of the Maastricht architecture for Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). Central to this failure
is the lack of any fiscal capacity for the euro area,
and the lack of a right to intervene in national pol-
icymaking that a central authority would normally
need. The EMU architecture must be strengthened
by taking steps towards a fiscal union that
involves both a political authority (a euro-area
‘finance minister’) and fiscal resources to prevent,
manage and resolve crises. On balance, Latvia’s
accession to the euro makes sense.
The euro area faces three major challenges.
First, it is confronted with very high private and
public debt levels in some of its parts, and a
formidable adjustment challenge. The debt is not
only held domestically. In Spain, Portugal and
Greece, debt owed to creditors outside of the
country is above 80 percent of GDP (see Ahearne
and Wolff, 2012). Repaying external debt while at
the same time being obliged to reduce prices to
become competitive and export more to repay for
the external debt is extremely difficult. In fact,
historical lessons show that even the external
interest burden can become difficult to shoulder1. 
Figure 1 summarises the difficulty of internal
devaluation in the euro area.
Broadly speaking, since the onset of the crisis,
price adjustment has been modest or absent in
most euro-area countries. Greece continued to lose
price competitiveness, as did Italy, even though in
the last 6-12 months some adjustment is evident.
Germany’s relative position has not changed, and
its competitiveness remains unchanged. Spain and
in particular Ireland have become more competi-
tive. Similarly, current-account divergence has
reduced since the beginning of the crisis, but sig-
nificant differences in deficits and surpluses
remain, with Greece still running a current account
deficit of 10 percent and Germany continuing to
have a 5 percent surplus.
Real macroeconomic adjustment in EMU is prov-
ing very difficult. For the Latvian Saeima, this is
not a surprising message of course. Zsolt Darvas
of Bruegel has argued in a paper comparing Latvia
with Ireland and Iceland that insisting on an inter-
nal devaluation in Latvia has had significant
social consequences. It is also clear, however, that
a devaluation would have implied significant costs
in terms of external assets and liabilities. More-
over, a devaluation could have implied a loss of
credibility in the policy framework and may have
delayed some reforms that Latvia was now
required to undertake quickly. In the euro area,
internal devaluation is happening much more
slowly because financial support is provided by
the European Central Bank and from other
sources. This sustains domestic demand and
reduces price adjustment needs. In fact, one of the
striking features of the Greek economy is that,
despite all the fiscal austerity, Greece is still run-
ning a current account deficit of 10 percent.
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Source: Eurostat. * Real effective exchange rate relative to
16 euro-area trading partners.
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Gr
ee
ce
Fr
an
ce
Ita
ly
Au
st
ria
Fi
nl
an
d
Po
rt
ug
al
Ire
la
nd
Ge
rm
an
y
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Sp
ai
n
Unit labour cost
Consumer price index
Figure 1: Changes in real effective exchange
rate* (%), 2007-11
Second, economic growth in the euro area as a
whole and in particular in the so-called periphery
is very weak. Growth forecasts have been revised
downwards. None of the four big euro-area
economies, ie France, Germany, Italy and Spain,
is projected to grow more than 1 percent in 2012,
according to European Commission forecasts.
Third, European Banking Authority stress tests
have not restored trust in the euro-area banking
system. More worryingly, the euro-area banking
system lacks a credible fiscal lender of last resort.
National finance ministries in the periphery
cannot credibly prevent deposit runs or
withdrawals of funds from banks located in their
country by themselves, as they are too small and
may lack access to markets to borrow at good
rates. We have seen the build-up of such negative
feed-back loops from an increasingly fragile
sovereign to an increasingly fragile banking
system. Purely national strategies will fail to stop
this banking fragility.
During 2011, euro-area leaders took a number of
significant steps to overcome these problems. At
the summit of 8-9 December 2011, leaders agreed
on tougher and more biting fiscal rules, which are
to be mostly implemented at national level. This
will help to increase fiscal discipline and thereby
help to prevent from happening again problems of
the kind currently seen in Greece. Such measures
will also to some extent be helpful in increasing
investors’ trust in a country’s political ability to
repay debt. For example, the Spanish debt break
enshrined in the Spanish constitution is a strong
signal and may contribute to the comparatively
low Spanish interest rates in relation to Italy’s.
In exchange for more commitments to fiscal
discipline, significant money has been put on the
table. This includes €150 billion for the
International Monetary Fund decided at the
December 2011 summit, on top of €500 billion for
the European Financial Stability Facility/European
Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) decided earlier.
Even without leveraging, up to €700 billion could
2. Eurogroup and Economic
and Finance Ministers
Council, Brussels, 20-21
February 2012.
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‘The 21 February deal on Greece is positive news for the euro area. It removes to a great extent a
major uncertainty for international investors, because a disorderly default scenario or even a
Greek exit from the euro is off the table for now. But Greece still lacks a growth outlook.’
be available to help countries with liquidity
problems. In addition, leaders re-affirmed their
promise that Greece would remain a unique case
and no other country would impose losses on
investors. For the time being, private-sector
involvement thus appears to be ruled out.
The new ESM treaty requires the introduction of
collective action clauses (CAC) with an
aggregation clause. These CACs are introduced for
government securities of all euro-area countries.
The ESM treaty foresees that financial assistance
is granted to ESM members that require such
assistance. The treaty stipulates that: “In
accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional
cases an adequate and proportionate form of
private sector involvement shall be considered in
cases where stability support is provided
accompanied by conditionality in the form of a
macro-economic adjustment programme.” The
key reference is here to IMF practices. IMF
practices foresee that financial assistance is only
granted in case the IMF assesses a country to be
solvent. It is clear, however, that a solvency
assessment always rests on a fair degree of
judgement and assumptions regarding the
development of interest rates, growth and
inflation. Ultimately, there may still be cases of
significant private sector involvement in case the
economic situation of a country is so bad that full
debt-repayment of official loans appears unlikely.
The advantage of collective action clauses is that
the restructuring will be made much easier. The
new system applying to newly issued debt will
thus allow for restructuring of debt according to
defined CAC.
The 21 February deal on Greece2 is positive news
for the euro area. It removes to a great extent a
major uncertainty for international investors,
because a disorderly default scenario or even a
Greek exit from the euro is off the table for now.
Any future debt restructuring will have to come
from the public sector. Official sector involvement
(OSI) will be politically difficult but it will not be a
problem for the stability of the financial system.
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3. Henning and Kessler
(2012) make this point in
the context of their account
of the development of the
US federation over the last
200 years. Bruegel fellows
have repeatedly made this
point in the euro-area
context.
However, details matter and some details still
need to be clarified. In particular, the private-
sector involvement (PSI) was agreed by those
around the table on 21 February. There is still a
debate on retroactive application of collective
action clauses to Greek government securities
and how this will play out. This should be watched.
Debt sustainability is also not yet guaranteed and
further discussions can be expected in case of
negative shocks with more OSI.
More worryingly, Greece still lacks an encouraging
growth outlook. While the deal has avoided a cat-
astrophic scenario, the highest priority now needs
to be to offer opportunities for growth. Ultimately,
this growth will have to come from exports. To get
exports growing, an increase in competitiveness
and an internal devaluation are necessary. The
better the policy measures implemented for that
purpose, the easier real economic adjustment and
the better the political dynamics will be. The deci-
sion to give priority to debt repayments via an
escrow account is understandable. It is a binding
constraint on political choices in Greece right now.
It is, however, a risky strategy from a political point
of view. This may be accepted for now while
Greece has little room for manoeuvre. The political
view might change in the future. The Greek gov-
ernment might want to renegotiate the deal. The
escrow account will likely be a focal point of polit-
ical and public resistance against foreign involve-
ment in the country, and the question of its
democratic legitimacy will arise.
But major challenges for the euro area remain, in
particular in relation to the real economic
adjustment, the growth agenda and the right
institutional set-up for dealing with the fragility of
the EMU banking sector. Stepping up the euro-
area's institutional framework also means that a
serious debate will have to take place about the
democratic foundations of the new framework.
While markets have calmed recently, significant
risks remain. So what is missing and why is the
current solution unsatisfactory?
First, a euro-area growth strategy is missing but is
urgently needed. Without significantly higher
economic growth in southern Europe, debt
dynamics in combination with price adjustment
needs will jeopardise sustainability. At the regional
and national levels, reforms need to focus on
improving supply-side conditions for business,
including better administration, governance and
rule of law, and significantly better education and
innovation systems. The key reform needed is
improvement of the conditions for exports. An
economy with an external debt overhang needs to
export to generate growth and to adjust. Price and
wage adjustments are necessary in that regard.
At the euro-area level, the macroeconomic policy
mix needs to be appropriate. Monetary policy
alone may prove insufficient to boost demand in
the face of a severe downturn. Therefore, a euro-
area-level mechanism to boost demand may
become necessary. After all, it should be recalled
that federal states such as the USA have strong
anticyclical fiscal policies at the federal level,
while at a state level, balanced budget rules render
public budgets pro-cyclical. In the euro area, the
new fiscal rules – if successful – will reduce anti-
cyclical fiscal policy action, which is currently
anyway limited because of market pressure3.
Currently, the euro area is not equipped with
appropriate tools for this. It is advisable to think
about putting in place a robust euro-area
mechanism for a euro-area investment project, eg
financed through project bonds.
Second, the integrated euro-area banking system
needs an integrated and powerful banking super-
vision and resolution authority backed by suffi-
cient means to prevent bank runs. The current
system centred on national supervisors and
national fiscal resources is clearly fragile. A true
euro-area deposit insurance corporation (EDIC),
ultimately backed by the euro-area taxpayer,
might become necessary and would increase sta-
bility. This EDIC would have the power to super-
vise, control and resolve all systemically
important banks in the euro area. It would also
need to correct the currently highly pro-cyclical
bias induced by the strategy to increase banks’
capital ratios.
Third, a solution to deal with debt overhang is
needed. Ultimately, if debts are too large to be
repaid from purely national resources, financial
assistance will be needed and a framework for
orderly restructuring needs to be in place. The
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4. Currently, the interest
cost of all euro-area debt is
3.7 percent of euro-area
GDP. The euro-area finance
ministry would thus need
tax-raising power equiva-
lent to at least 4 percent of
euro-area GDP to credibly
take on all debt. National
taxes could be reduced by a
similar amount so that the
overall tax burden for the
average euro-area citizen
would not change.
5. For a detailed exposition
of such as set up see
Marzinotto et al (2011).
6. The assistance given via
the EFSM is, of course,
backed by the EU budget
and therefore concerns all
member states.
ment, euro-area accession would bring benefits.
• Having a fixed exchange-rate implies that mon-
etary policy independence is largely gone. Thus
it is preferable to join the euro and be part of the
monetary policy decision-making process.
• Joining the euro would have beneficial effects
for the banking system because access to ECB
liquidity will be granted. Membership would
also imply significantly lower interest rates
than the current interest rate of 3.5 percent,
compared to the ECB rate of 1 percent. Of
course, it will be crucial that Latvia avoids after
accession the mistakes of previous euro
accession countries, and does not use the
overly low interest rate to start a consumption
boom based on cheap borrowing. The new EU
excessive imbalances procedure should  mean
such developments are closely monitored.
• It is clear that the euro-area club is very
different from the club as it was in 2007. The
political logic dictates that Latvia will join the
European Stability Mechanism, and thus make
a contribution, estimated to amount to about
€200 million to be paid over five years. This will
of course be a burden to the Latvian budget.
However, it is clear that the euro area is only
attractive if it is stable and every member of the
club needs to contribute to this stability.
Moreover, the ESM provides insurance that will
also benefit Latvia in case of need.
• The newly signed fiscal compact reduces
national fiscal sovereignty somewhat, but
needs to be signed as a condition of access to
the ESM. However, fiscal prudence appears to
be advisable in Latvia in any case, and will also
have to be stuck to if Latvia stays out of the
euro and keeps its exchange rate fixed.
• In the negotiations on the ESM, Latvia should
make the clear request not to be burdened with
any existing liabilities resulting from financial
assistance programmes decided before its
adoption of the euro . This means in particular,
that any past financial assistance that had
been given to Greece and that will in the future
be given to Greece via the ESM based on a
decision taken now should not concern Latvia.
‘A solution to deal with debt overhang is needed. The current structure around the ESM may prove
insufficient. It may become necessary to pool all euro-area public debt. To issue such common debt, a
common treasury with tax-raising powers appears necessary.’
current structure around the ESM may prove
insufficient in terms of size, decision-making
mechanism and set-up for dealing with a crisis in
one of the larger euro-area countries. It may
therefore become necessary, to pool all euro-area
public debt. To issue such common debt, a
common treasury with tax-raising powers appears
necessary4.
The most efficient way to address these three
points is to create a truly federal structure with a
finance minister at euro-area level who has the
authority to raise taxes5. This raise the question
of EU versus euro-area. A number of guiding
principles should be kept in mind.
1 Member states that will soon join the euro
should certainly be playing a part in the
negotiations about the set-up of the new
governance framework. It is welcome that the
fiscal compact has been signed by many
countries outside the euro area.
2 It appears reasonable that decisions on finan-
cial assistance to a euro-area member are
mostly a matter for countries of the euro area –
in particular as long as the assistance is paid
from euro-area fiscal resources6. 
3 A robust new framework for banking supervi-
sion and resolution will require steps towards
deep integration. Economic and political logic
suggests that this will mostly happen at euro-
area level. However, the strong degree of finan-
cial integration with non-euro area members
will require a high level of information sharing,
as is already done within the European Sys-
temic Risk Board and the European Banking
Authority.
Finally, some remarks can be made about Latvia’s
euro-area accession. Putting aside the geopolitical
and historic reasons for Latvia to join, on balance,
Latvia should join the euro. The following points
should be considered in this regard:
• After Latvia’s decision to keep the exchange
rate fixed and after largely achieving adjust-
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Latvia should only be held liable for those
decisions in which it participates. 
• One may argue that given the current uncer-
tainties surrounding the euro it might be advis-
able to wait and see how the situation develops
before joining. I see some value in this argu-
ment. However, it is also clear that members of
the club have more scope to shape the way the
club develops than EU countries that have not
joined the euro. Moreover, given the fact that
the exchange rate is fixed to the euro, any major
perturbation of the euro area would in any case
have significant implications for Latvia. Finally,
by the time of Latvian accession to the euro,
the contours of the euro area’s governance
should be already well defined.
• Latvia should not only be fit to join the euro but
should also be able to live with the competitive
pressure inside the currency union to be able
to prosper. Some further reforms may still be
needed to achieve this goal. Certainly one
lesson from the current crisis is that the more
real convergence is achieved before joining the
euro, the less likely problems are to arise later.
Let me add a final point on accession: the most
difficult target for Latvia to meet appears to be the
inflation criterion, which should, according to the
treaty, be the average inflation rate of the three
countries with the lowest rate in the EU plus 1.5
percent. This criterion does not make sense in
current circumstances. Several euro-area
countries will have very low inflation rates in the
next few years in order to achieve internal
devaluation. They should not be considered as a
benchmark. Instead, euro-area inflation should be
taken as the appropriate reference value. Darvas
(2009) has made this point previously. One
option, if a treaty change is ruled out, would be to
allow some flexibility in this rule by omitting
outliers from the sample.
In summary: the euro area has taken significant
steps to overcome its crisis. The six-pack, fiscal
compact and ESM are important steps that go in
the right direction. The fiscal compact, however,
raises the issue of appropriate fiscal stabilisation
tools at the euro-area level.
The 21 February deal on Greece is an important
practical milestone because it has removed a
major uncertainty. While it is clear that Greece’s
problems are not solved, they are much less of a
concern for financial stability now. Further Greek
debt restructuring will eventually become
necessary but this will concern the public loans to
Greece and is therefore more of a political than a
financial-stability problem.
However, major challenges remain. There is still a
significant risk of a confidence crisis involving one
of the larger euro-area economies. It is unlikely
that this could be dealt with within the current
framework. Banking sector fragility persists and
remains a major concern. The ECB’s current Long
Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) policy
provides much needed liquidity but cannot
address solvency concerns. Finally, real economic
adjustment is happening far too slowly.
Ultimately, in the author’s view, the euro area will
need to create a euro-area finance ministry with
tax-raising powers and significant authority in the
budget, structural and banking fields. History
shows that monetary unions require this. All
countries outside the euro area that might soon
become part of it should actively participate in the
debate about such a new set-up. On balance, I
would make the case for Latvia’s euro-area
accession even though it comes with a price.
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